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The attention which is given to terrorism is often considered disproportionately to its real danger. The use of terror as a mean 
to attain personal or political objectives exists all over the world. Terrorism incidents kill and maim millions of people. People strive 
for power and these power-wielding individuals may commit terrible acts. 
Modern terrorist ideology has changed. Victims of terrorism are often those who have no offensive intentions towards the ter-
rorists – passengers, journalists, diplomats, educators, students, business executives and other civilians. 
Nowadays terrorists are more likely to choose this tactics rather than the traditional methods - assassinations of heads of state 
or prominent officials. Terrorists prefer easy targets.
Less than 12 hours after the 9/11 attacks, George W. Bush proclaimed the start of a global war on terror. Ever since, there has 
been a vigorous debate about how to win it. Bush and his supporters emphasized the need for the offensive attack against terrorists 
and to use all existing levers for countering such brutalities.
Radicalization and terrorism have become major problems at national, regional and global levels, as a threat to collective secu-
rity. Deepening the problem even more, the significance of Terrorism personifies not only casualties and annihilation of the enemy 
but also implies moral claims. 
The aim of this paper is to analyze whether it is possible to win the global war on terror and make readers get acquainted with 
the coordinated, collective and global structuring war effort which has developed since 9/11.
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Introduction
 
Terrorism has not just begun, and even though it has been 
used since the beginning of recorded history it can be relatively 
hard to define. Terrorism has been described variously as both a 
tactics and a strategy; a crime and a holy duty; a justified reac-
tion to oppression and an inexcusable abomination. (Terrorism 
History, Insurgency, Types of Terrorism, 2010). Obviously, a 
lot depends on whose point of view is being represented. It has 
often been an effective tactics for the weaker side in a conflict. 
The United States Department of Defense defines terrorism as 
“the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful 
violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate 
governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are gener-
ally political, religious, or ideological.” (International Terror-
ism and Security Research, 2013) Outside the United States 
Government, there are more variations among definitions of 
terrorism. The United Nations produced this definition in 1992; 
“An anxiety-inspiring method idiosyncratic, criminal or politi-
cal reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct 
targets of violence are not the main targets.” (Schmid & Jong-
man, 1988)
Terrorism is a denial of the obligation of self-control and 
involves unacceptable violence because of its cruelty and un-
expectedness. The victims of terrorism are often those who 
bear the least offensive intentions toward the terrorists – airline 
passengers, journalists, diplomats, educators, students, busi-
ness executives and other civilians. 
Terrorism is often referred as the “weapon of the weak”. It 
usually refers to small ideological groups that lack a large num-
bers of supporters. However, terrorist tactics can accompany 
large-scale liberal movements.1 
It influences an audience by using an immediate victim. 
The strategy of terrorists is to commit acts of violence that 
draws the attention of the local populace, the government, and 
the world to their cause. The terrorists plan their attack to ob-
tain the greatest publicity, choosing targets that symbolize what 
they oppose. The effectiveness of the terrorist act lies not in the 
act itself, but in the public’s or government’s reaction to the act. 
For example, in 1972 at the Munich Olympics, the Black Sep-
tember Organization killed 11 Israelis. The Israelis were the 
immediate victims. But the true target was estimated 1 billion 
people watching the televised event.2 That is why preemption 
is being considered to be so important. In some cases, terrorism 
has been a mean to carry on a conflict without the adversary re-
alizing the nature of the threat, mistaking terrorism for criminal 
activity. Because of these characteristics, terrorism has become 
1  The Algerian FLN was responsible for the 1956-57 campaign of bombings of European civilians in Algiers, which together with the severely repressive 
French response constituted the “Battle of Algiers”, subsequently dramatized in a popular film directed by Gillo Pontecorvo.
2  Read more about Black September and the Murder of 11 Israelis at the 1972 Munich Olympics: http://middleeast.about.com/od/terrorism/a/me080803e.htm
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increasingly common among those pursuing extreme goals 
throughout the world. (International Terrorism and Security 
Research, 2013)
There are three perspectives of terrorism: the terrorist’s, 
the victim’s, and the general public’s. The phrase “one man’s 
terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” is a view that terror-
ists themselves would accept. Terrorists do not see themselves 
as evil. They believe they are legitimate combatants, fighting 
for what they believe in, by all available means. A victim of a 
terrorist act sees the terrorist as a criminal with no regard for 
human life. General public’s view is the most unstable. Terror-
ists take great pains to foster a “Robin Hood” image in hope 
of swaying general public’s opinion towards their cause. This 
sympathetic view of terrorism has become an integral part of 
their psychological warfare and needs to be countered vigor-
ously. (International Terrorism and Security Research, 2013)
In the process of defining the concept of terrorism it is crit-
ical to isolate terrorism from specific political goals; that is, all 
nationalists, and revolutionaries of far-right extremists are not 
terrorists. No particular ideology or religion is responsible for 
such actions. That is why identifying risk groups is especially 
difficult and that weakens progress of countering terrorism. 
Research on terrorism and terrorism-related issues has in-
creased dramatically in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. This is 
not surprising. 9/11 witnessed the most destructive terrorist as-
saults in recorded history, and the attacks led to far bloodier 
conflicts as part of the subsequent war on terror. Terrorism has 
become the defining issue of international politics of the first 
decade of the 21st century. 
A Historical Turning Point
On September 11, 2001, 19 militants associated with the 
Islamic extremist group al-Qaeda hijacked four airliners and 
carried out suicide attacks against targets in the United States. 
Two of the planes were flown into the towers of the World 
Trade Center in New York City, a third plane hit the Pentagon 
just outside Washington, D.C., and the fourth plane crashed in 
a field in Pennsylvania. Often referred to as 9/11, the attacks re-
sulted in extensive death and destruction, triggering major U.S. 
initiatives to combat terrorism and defining the presidency of 
George W. Bush. Over 3,000 people were killed during the at-
tacks in New York City and Washington, D.C., including more 
than 400 police officers and firefighters. 
Suspicion quickly fell on al-Qaeda, and in 2004, the group’s 
leader Osama bin Laden, who had initially denied involvement, 
claimed responsibility for the attacks afterwards. Al-Qaeda and 
bin Laden cited U.S. support of Israel, the presence of U.S. 
troops in Saudi Arabia, and sanctions against Iraq as motives 
for the attacks. The United States responded to the attacks by 
launching the War on Terror and invading Afghanistan to de-
pose the Taliban, which had harbored Al-Qaeda. Many coun-
tries strengthened their anti-terrorism legislation and expanded 
law enforcement powers. In May 2011, after years at large, bin 
Laden was found and killed.
The September 11 attacks still remain the deadliest terrorist 
attacks in the history of the world. The attackers of New York’s 
World Trade Center created an unparalleled shock effect, but 
signally failed to communicate their motivation and intention 
to their victims. It changed the millennial generation’s lives. 
(Thomas H. Kean et al, 2004)
A survey by American University’s School of Commu-
nication found 7 out of 10 respondents said their lives were 
changed by the events of September 11, 2001. The survey 
questioned 18-29 year-old people about attacks, and showed 
that although young adults were affected they do not live in 
fear. The same margin of respondents said they do not worry 
about another terrorist acts. (Crowe, 2011)
Resulting Global “War on Terror” 
The phrase ‘War on Terror’ was first used by US Presi-
dent George W. Bush and other high-ranking US officials to 
denote a global military, political, legal and ideological strug-
gle against terrorist organizations and regimes accused of hav-
ing connection to them, providing them with support or posing 
a threat to the US and its allies in general. (Political, 2012) It 
was typically used with a particular focus on militant Islamists 
and al-Qaeda.
The global war on terrorism (GWOT), according to the 
U.S. Department of State, is “being fought by many means--
through diplomatic, military, financial, intelligence, investiga-
tive, and law enforcement actions--at home and abroad,” with 
the Department of State in the “lead role on the diplomatic front 
abroad to advance the cause of the coalition against terrorism. 
The Department also works closely with other agencies and 
organizations to shut down terrorist financial networks, provide 
humanitarian aid, and to investigate terrorist organizations and 
activities and bring terrorists to justice.” 
“The attack took place on American soil, but it was an at-
tack on the heart and soul of the civilized world. And the world 
has come together to fight a new and different war, the first, 
and we hope the only one, of the 21st century. A war against 
all those who seek to export terror and a war against those gov-
ernments that support or shelter them.” (Johnston’s Archive , 
2001) - President George W. Bush.
Operations Enduring Freedom 
Afghanistan
On 20 September 2001, in the wake of the 11 September 
attacks, George W. Bush delivered an ultimatum to the Taliban 
government of Afghanistan to turn over Osama bin Laden and 
al-Qaeda leaders operating in the country or face attack. The 
Taliban demanded evidence of bin Laden’s link to the 11 Sep-
tember attacks and, if such evidence warranted a trial, they of-
fered to handle such a trial in an Islamic Court. The US refused 
to provide any evidence.
Subsequently, in October 2001, US forces (with UK and 
coalition allies) invaded Afghanistan to oust the Taliban regime. 
On 7 October 2001, the official invasion began with British and 
US forces conducting airstrike campaigns over enemy targets. 
Kabul, the capital city of Afghanistan, fell by mid-November. 
The remaining al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants fell back to the 
rugged mountains of eastern Afghanistan, mainly Tora Bora. In 
December, Coalition forces fought within that region. (Political 
Sciences Concepts, 2013)
In March 2002, the US and other NATO and non-NATO 
forces launched Operation Anaconda with the goal of destroy-
ing any remaining al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in the Shah-i-
Kot Valley and Arma Mountains of Afghanistan. The Taliban 
suffered from heavy casualties and evacuated the region.
The Taliban regrouped in western Pakistan and began to 
The Global Fight of Terror: Implications of 9/11
Journal of Social Sciences; ISSN 2233-3878
25
unleash an insurgent-style offensive against Coalition forces 
in late 2002. Throughout southern and eastern Afghanistan, 
firefights broke out between the surging Taliban and Coalition 
forces. Coalition forces responded with a series of military of-
fensives and an increase in the amount of troops in Afghani-
stan. In February 2010, Coalition forces launched Operation 
Moshtarak in southern Afghanistan along with other military 
offensives in the hopes that they would destroy the Taliban in-
surgency once and for all. 
Horn of Africa
This extension of Operation Enduring Freedom was ti-
tled OEF-HOA. Unlike other operations contained in Opera-
tion Enduring Freedom, OEF-HOA does not have a specific 
organization as a target. In October 2002, the Combined Joint 
Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was established in 
Djibouti at Camp Lemonnier. It contains approximately 2,000 
personnel including US military and special operations forces 
(SOF) and coalition force members, Combined Task Force 150 
(CTF-150). (Feickert, 2006). 
Task Force 150 consists of ships from a shifting group of 
nations, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Pakistan, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. 
The primary goal of the coalition forces is to monitor, inspect, 
board and stop suspected shipments from entering the Horn of 
Africa region and affecting the US’ Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Operation consists of training of selected armed force units 
in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency tactics in Djibouti, 
Kenya and Ethiopia. The program expands as part of the Trans-
Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative as CJTF personnel also as-
sist in training the armed forces of Chad, Niger, Mauritania 
and Mali. However, the War on Terror does not include Sudan, 
where over 400,000 have died in an ongoing civil war. 3 
On July 1, 2006, a Web-posted message purportedly writ-
ten by Osama bin Laden urged Somalis to build an Islamic 
state in the country and warned western governments that the 
al-Qaeda network would fight against them if they intervened 
there.
Somalia has been considered a “failed state” because its 
official central government was weak, dominated by war-
lords and unable to exert effective control over the country. 
Beginning in mid-2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), an 
Islamist faction campaigning on a restoration of “law and or-
der” through Sharia law, had rapidly taken control of much of 
southern Somalia.
The Prime Minister of Somalia claimed that three “terror 
suspects” from the 1998 United States embassy bombings are 
being sheltered in Kismayo. On 30 December 2006, Al-Qaeda 
deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri called upon Muslims world-
wide to fight against Ethiopia and the TFG in Somalia. (Viv, 
2012)
Iraq
The Iraq War began in March 2003 with an air campaign, 
which was immediately followed by a U.S.-led ground inva-
sion. The Bush administration stated the invasion was the “se-
rious consequences” spoken about in the UNSC Resolution 
1441.4 Bush administration also stated the Iraq war was part of 
the War on Terror, something later questioned.
Baghdad, Iraq’s capital city, fell in April 2003 and Saddam 
Hussein’s government quickly dissolved. On 1 May 2003, 
Bush announced that major combat operations in Iraq had end-
ed. However, an insurgency arose against the U.S.-led coalition 
and developing Iraqi military and post-Saddam government. 
The insurgency, which included al-Qaeda affiliated groups, led 
to far more coalition casualties than the invasion. Other ele-
ments of the insurgency were led by fugitive members of Presi-
dent Hussein’s Ba’ath regime, which included Iraqi national-
ists and pan-Arabists. Many insurgency leaders are Islamists 
and claim to be fighting a religious war to reestablish the Is-
lamic Caliphate of centuries past. (Ware, 2004) Iraq’s former 
president, Saddam Hussein was captured by U.S. forces in De-
cember 2003. He was executed in 2006. In 2004, the insurgent 
forces grew stronger. The US conducted attacks on insurgent 
strongholds in cities like Najaf and Fallujah.
In January 2007, President Bush presented a new strategy 
for Operation Iraqi Freedom based upon counter-insurgency 
theories and tactics developed by General David Petraeus. 
The Iraq War troop surge of 2007 was part of this “new way 
forward” and, along with US backing of Sunni groups it had 
previously sought to defeat, has been credited with a widely 
recognized dramatic decrease in violence by up to 80%. 5
In March 2009 the Obama administration ordered an end 
to the use of the phrase “War on Terror”. In a memo sent from 
the Defense Department’s office of security to Pentagon staff-
ers, members were told: “This administration prefers to avoid 
using the term ‘Long War’ or ‘Global War on Terror.’ Please 
use ‘Overseas Contingency Operation.’” In a similar spirit, 
Obama’s Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, 
broke with the tradition of warning the American public about 
potential terrorist threats. Instead, Napolitano began referring 
to acts of terrorism as “man-caused disasters.” (Issues - War on 
Terror, 2012)
Countering Terrorism
9/11 changed not only American psyche but the global as 
well. The whole world saw the devastating effect of terrorism 
and felt in danger. The necessity of collaboration and collective 
security become even more vital.
The fight against terrorism has been high on the agen-
das of NATO and the wider international community before 
9/11. Massive terrorist attacks in Allied countries around the 
world maintained the danger of this threat, which does not halt 
at boarders and does not know nationality or religion. As re-
flected in the 2010 Strategic Concept for the Alliance, tackling 
with this threat remains one of NATO’s key priorities today. 
International society came up to the idea that only multilateral 
effort, coordination and actions among allies and partners can 
3 For additional information about the Republic of Sudan and recent history including independence and civil wars see http://www.sudan.net/about.php, the 
complete guide on Sudan.
4 Full text of the  Resolution 1441 (2002) , Adopted by the Security Council at its 4644th meeting, on 8 November 2002, is available here: http://www.iaea.
org/newscenter/focus/iaeairaq/iraqres.pdf
5 Complete text available at the website of VFW – Veterans of Foreign Wars: http://www.vfwpost8905.org/VFWHistory.asp
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effectively address the challenge. 
NATO ensures it has the full range of capabilities neces-
sary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and 
security. The Alliance contributes to the international fight 
against terrorism in several ways. 
• Develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable 
conventional forces to carry out both our Article 5 responsibili-
ties and the Alliance’s expeditionary operations, including with 
the NATO Response Force;
• Maintain the ability to sustain concurrent major joint op-
erations and several smaller operations for collective defense 
and crisis response, including at strategic distance;
• Carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency 
planning and information exchange for assuring our defense 
against the full range of conventional and emerging security 
challenges, and provide appropriate visible assurance and rein-
forcement for all Allies;
• Ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in 
collective defense planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime bas-
ing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consulta-
tion arrangements;
• Develop the capability to defend our populations and ter-
ritories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our 
collective defense, which contributes to the indivisible security 
of the Alliance. Actively seek cooperation on missile defense 
with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners;
• Further develop NATO’s capacity to defend against the 
threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weap-
ons of mass destruction;
• Develop further ability to prevent, detect, defend against 
and recover from cyber-attacks, including by using the NATO 
planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber-de-
fense capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralized 
cyber protection, and better integrating NATO cyber aware-
ness, warning and response with member nations;
• Enhance the capacity to detect and defend against inter-
national terrorism, including through enhanced analysis of the 
threat, more consultations with our partners, and the develop-
ment of appropriate military capabilities, including to help 
train local forces to fight terrorism themselves;
• Develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, in-
cluding protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit 
areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations 
among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contin-
gency planning;
• Ensure that the Alliance is at the front edge in assessing 
the security impact of emerging technologies, and that military 
planning takes the potential threats into account. (North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization, 2010)
A “Global” War on Terror: Multilateral Achievements 
since 9/11
In the decade since 9/11, the international community has 
shown remarkable cohesiveness and solidarity in its effort to 
protect innocent people from terrorist attacks, despite signifi-
cant challenges that remain. Much of this cooperation has oc-
curred under the radar, through quiet, everyday multilateral and 
bilateral cooperation among law enforcement agencies, intel-
ligence services, and militaries.
The most dramatic achievement, perhaps, is a more robust 
legal architecture to combat this scourge.  There are now six-
teen major UN conventions to combat terrorism. 6 Immediately 
after September 11, the UNSC passed Resolution 1373 forcing 
all UN member states to criminalize and police terrorist activ-
ity, including its financing. This resolution also created a Coun-
terterrorism Committee (CTC), composed of all fifteen UNSC 
members. Assisted by a Counter terror Executive Directorate 
(CTED), the CTC regularly assesses UN member states’ ef-
forts to implement relevant resolutions, evaluates gaps in state 
capacity, and facilitates donor coordination for technical and 
financial counterterrorism assistance.
Informal institutions have also contributed heavily. The 
Financial Action Task Force—an  intergovernmental body of 
thirty-six members originally established by the Group of Sev-
en (G7) in 1989 to address money laundering—penned nine 
special recommendations to counter terrorist financing.7 These 
measures became the global yardstick for states’ counter ter-
ror efforts, and the threat of landing on its blacklist of Non-
Cooperative Countries or Territories (NCCT) compelled many 
states to upgrade domestic legislation, ratify international con-
ventions, and monitor financial transactions.
Nuclear terrorism remains an existential threat to global 
security, but in April 2011 the UN Security Council extended 
the mandate of Resolution 1540, which requires states to pro-
tect nuclear materials and related technology from falling into 
the hands of non-state actors. A 2008 report had documented 
its success in requiring countries to ratify relevant treaties and 
take national action to protect nuclear sites from terrorists. 
(Patrick, 2011)
The Security Council has passed Resolution 1456 - requir-
ing that states’ counter-terror efforts comply with international 
human rights law.
• Build capacity in developing countries: The U.S. and 
other UNSC members should provide vulnerable countries 
with nonmilitary security funding that often falls into the gap 
between traditional development assistance, on the one hand, 
and military spending that does not adequately combat terror-
ism, on the other. 
• Link human rights and counterterrorism: The United 
States and other Security Council members should encourage 
the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council to des-
ignate terrorism as a violation of human rights, given the threat 
it poses to human life and dignity, to freedom from fear, and to 
civilian immunity from deadly force.
• Strengthen nuclear security to prevent terrorist access: 
UNSC Resolution requires UN states to take “appropriate ef-
fective measures” to safeguard nuclear material, but the stand-
ard remains vague and lacks provisions for effective monitor-
ing.
• Fortify compliance and enforcement: The Security Coun-
cil should instruct CTED to monitor enforcement of counter 
6   See International Instruments related to the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism, UN Sales No. E.01.V.3, ISBN 92-1-133631-7 http://trea-
ties.un.org/Pages/DB.aspx?path=DB/studies/page2_en.xml
7  The 40+9 Recommendations, together with their interpretative notes, provide the international standards for combating money laundering and terrorist 
financing. The FATF revised the 40 and IX Recommendations. The revision of the FATF Recommendations was adopted and published in February 2012. 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/
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terror laws, so that UN member states cannot ignore legisla-
tion they have enacted. The United States should also seek to 
establish a UN body to investigate states’ compliance with their 
commitments, and publish reports of their findings that can be 
made publicly available.
Yet that cannot change the atrocity of September 11 as it 
killed many innocent people. People have surmised that when 
other regions around the world have faced similar terrorist at-




Real problems still remain. Threat perceptions also differ. 
Even after two severe attacks Kenya considers terrorism as a 
lesser priority than other pressing challenges like HIV/AIDS, 
extreme poverty or high levels of crime. Even more glaring, the 
world has not agreed on one definition for terrorism yet, throw-
ing a wrench in counter terror efforts. Too often, one person’s 
terrorist remains another person’s freedom fighter. Terrorist fi-
nancing, too, continues to bedevil law enforcement and intelli-
gence agencies. Notwithstanding immense success in blocking 
access to banks, terrorist groups are adept at exploiting “ha-
wala” and other forms of informal cash transfer, which remain 
nearly impossible to monitor. Finally, human rights concerns 
continue to plague counterterrorism. Over the past decade, in-
definite detention, extraordinary rendition, ghost prisons, and 
enhanced interrogation techniques have all been employed in 
the name of defending civilians from terrorism. And some re-
pressive regimes—including a few U.S. allies—have invoked 
the bogeyman of terrorism to defend brutal oppression of le-
gitimate political opposition. (Patrick, 2011)
Global Fight on Terror can’t defeat terrorism for a quite 
long time, since there are not certainly defined tools how inter-
national society should act in process of countering terrorism. 
Firstly, in order to combat terrorism we should eradicate the 
motives and real reasons of terroristic acts. Secondly, distinc-
tion between an individual and collective terrorism should be 
made. As an asymmetric form of conflict, it confers coercive 
power with many of the advantages of military force at a frac-
tion of the cost. Due to the secretive nature and small size of 
terrorist organizations, they often offer opponents no clear or-
ganization to fight against or to deter. Thirdly, we have to con-
sider that inspirations of all risk groups to commit such terrible 
acts are various. 
Identification of all these risk groups according to their risk 
commitment is most essential step in combating terrorism. It is 
easier to combat with terroristic organization than against indi-
viduals committing suicide bombing and attacks. Identifying 
collective aims and objections is also much easier than identi-
fying individual concerns and commitment. 
Therefore, achievements of counterterrorist actions will 
require attaining consensus on a definition and capacity of 
Terrorism. It will need an increase in counterterrorism legisla-
tive authorities, funding for further management planning and 
deepening efforts to keep the world’s most destructive weapons 
out of the world’s least trustworthy hands.
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